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Abstrak 
Artikel ini bertujuan untuk menguji serangkaian teori tentang kebijakan bantuan luar 
negeri AS. Tiga teori yang diuji adalah: interest-driven theory, humanitarian theory 
dan domestic political theory. Dengan menggunakan data longitudinal mengenai 
jumlah Bantuan Pembangunan Resmi (ODA) yang diberikan oleh AS ke 155 negara 
penerima dari tahun 1960 sampai 2008, yang dianalisa dengan menggunakan random 
coefficient model, penelitian ini menemukan bahwa humanitarian theory dan 
domestic political theory lebih dapat menjelaskan kebijakan bantuan luar negeri AS 
selama hampir lima decade. Secara umum, AS lebih cenderung untuk memberikan 
bantuan luar negeri ODA ke negara-negara miskin dan/atau negara-negara dimana 
LSM-LSM AS banyak beraktivitas di negara itu. Model-model econometric yang 
digunakan juga menemukan bahwa ada variasi antar-negara dan antar-waktu dalam 
jumlah ODA yang diberikan AS. Rata-rata, negara- negara yang menerima bantuan 
ODA lebih besar pada tahun 1960an akan cendrung memiliki tingkat pertumbuhan 
bantuan ODA dari AS yang lebih kecil dari waktu ke waktu.  
 
Kata kunci: ODA, US, Kontrol kepentingan, humanitarian, politik domestik, 
membangun model, Random Coefficient Models  
 
Abstract 
This article aims to test competing explanations about the US foreign aid policy, 
namely interest-driven theory, humanitarian theory, and domestic political theory. 
Using longitudinal data on the amount of Official Development Assistance provided 
by the US to 155 recipient countries from 1960 to 2008, analyzed using random 
coefficient models, the research found that humanitarian and domestic political 
theories can account for the US foreign aid policy to the recipient countries for 
almost five decades better than the interest-driven theory. Generally, the US were 
more likely to send aid to poorer countries and/or countries where the US-based 
NGOs were actively involved. The econometric models also show that there are 
some cross-sectional and temporal variations in the aid. On average, countries 
receiving high amount of aid in the 1960s tend to have lower annual growth rate in 
the money they received from the US. 
 
Keywords: ODA, US, Interest-Driven, Humanitarian, Domestic Politics, Growth 
Models, Random Coefficient Mode
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Introduction 
What explains the variation in the 
amount of US foreign aids received by  
developing countries annually? Is the 
decision about foreign aids shaped by 
strategic interests, humanitarian factors or 
the activities of particular domestic 
political actors in the recipient countries? 
In this paper, I will attempt to reexamine 
the debate on US foreign aids and test 
three arguments brought up in the 
literature: interest-driven theory, 
humanitarian theory and domestic political 
theory. This paper will proceed by firstly 
laying out the three literature on US 
foreign aid policy. It is followed by some 
theoretical arguments of the three theories 
and their expectations about US foreign 
aids. In the method section, I will describe 
the data and estimation strategy. This will 
be followed by result section. In the 
conclusion, I summarize the main findings 
and their implications for future research. 
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Literature Review: Three Models of US 
Foreign Aid Policy 
The politics of US foreign aids is a 
complex topic that has generated a wealth 
of studies. In general, there are three big 
theories for why the US gives foreign aids 
to another country. The first theory can be 
called interest-driven aid theory. This 
theory generally argues that foreign aid is 
one of foreign policy intruments used to 
advance the interest of aid providers (the 
US) in the targetted countries (Hook 1995; 
Palmer, Wohlander, and Morgan 2002). 
Some scholars such as McKinlay and 
Little (1977; 1979) for example, who 
investigated US official bilateral economic 
aid from 1960-1970 found that US foreign 
aid policy was consistent with what they 
called donor interest model. A comparative 
analysis of foreign aid policy of some 
industrial countries supports McKinlay 
and Little’s findings: the providers give 
aid either to advanced their interest or 
maintain the loyalty of former colonies 
(Schraeder, Hook and Taylor 1998).  
There are three variables 
commonly employed by scholars in this 
theory: ally, democracy and strategic 
region. First, due its security commitment, 
the US is more likely to disburse its 
foreign aids to allies. This is best 
exemplified by US annual foreign aids to 
Israel (Sharp 2015). Second, because of its 
belief that democracies are more peaceful 
and important to US security (Russett 
1993), US is expected to give more aids to 
promote and support democratization 
process in developing countries. Thus, it is 
expected that the amount of money given 
to non-democracies (including nascent 
democracies) is higher than that given to 
stable democracies. Finally, because US 
interests differ regionally, we might expect 
that there will be some variations in the 
number of foreign aids given by  the US to 
these regions. Strategically, Middle East is 
the most important region for the US 
because the region consists of militarily 
balanced countries and prone to conflicts. 
US also has some allies there and needs 
the oil from the region to support its 
economy. Some scholars have documented 
US dependence on oil from the Middle 
East and this what drives US increasingly 
deep involvement in the conflict (see e.g., 
Jones 2012). In addition, compared with 
other regions, the competition of regional 
powers in the region is very tight. This is 
especially true since the end of the Cold 
War where great powers such as Russia 
and UK began to withdraw themselves 
from the region. The region was set to be 
unstable in the post Cold War era. US 
needs to be involved more deeply to 
protect its oil interests and also its allies in 
the region. From this explanation, we can 
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generate hypothesis on interest-driven 
theory that: 
H1: The Amount of US foreign aids given 
to US ally will be higher than the amount 
of foreign aids given to non-ally.   
H2: The amount of US foreign aids to non-
democracies will be higher than the 
amount of foreign aids given to stable 
democracies. 
H3: The amount of US foreign aids given 
to countries in the Middle East will be 
higher than the amount of foreign aids 
given to countries in other regions.  
The second theory of aid provision 
is humanitarian theory. This theory 
explains foreign aid policy from the 
perspective of recipient’s need. This theory 
argues that the US disbursed foreign aids 
due to humanitarian factors such as 
humanitarian crises or poverty. Some 
research on foreign aids, for example, 
found that even during the Cold War 
period when strategic-security interests 
dominated major powers’ foreign policy, 
humanitarian factors had become the main 
driver for US foreign aids (McCormick 
and Mitchell 1988; Meernik, Krueger, and 
Poe 1998; Lai 2003). This trend has even 
been more obvious after the Cold War 
ended when global focus shifted to 
development issues (Meernik et al 1998). 
Thus, this theory expects that:  
H4: the amount of US foreign aids to a 
poorer country is higher than the amount 
of foreign aids given to a richer country. 
The third theory explaining foreign 
aids is domestic political theory. This 
theory sees the important role played by 
domestic political actors especially NGOs 
whose field experience allows them to 
speak authoritatively about the situations 
in a foreign country (DeMars 2005). 
Because of their access to ciritical 
information on domestic situations in a 
foreign country, these NGOs are able to 
form close partnership with donor 
government in need of intimate 
information about the foreign country, thus 
enable the NGOs to shape donor’s foreign 
aid policy (Kim 2014; Lewis 2007). 
However, to what extent NGOs can 
influence governments depend on their 
credibility as sources of information and 
their effectiveness as aid operators. By 
establishing reputation as an experienced 
agent in one particular issue in developing 
country, these NGOs can gain 
governments’ trust and because of this 
trust, they can easily influence 
governments to disburse some money to 
support their works in developing 
countries. Thus,  
H5: the amount of US foreign aids will 
increase as the number of US-based NGO 
operations in a country increases. 
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Data and Methods  
To test the three theories, I use data 
set provided by Youngwan Kim (2014). 
The data set was provided through Harvard 
Dataverse and originally used for his 
article published in Foreign Policy 
Analysis. The data set is longitudinal data 
which covers 155 countries to which the 
US gave foreign aids from 1960-2008. The 
total numbers of observations are 7,595. 
Due to some missing data, the final 
observations used to fit the full model are 
5,669. The unit of analysis is country-year 
(repeated measure within country). The 
dependent variable in this research is the 
amount of US Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) received by a particular 
country in a particular year (measured in 
constant 2006 dollars). However, because 
the data are very skewed, I log-transform 
the variable to normalize the data. The data 
were originally collected by Kim from the 
OECD database. Net disbursement of 
ODA is widely used as the measure of 
foreign aid in the literature since this 
measure can capture the actual annual 
amount of foreign aid given by donors 
(Feyzioglu, Swaroop, and Zhu 1998; 
Easterly 2003; McGillivray 2003). The 
main independent variables are the 
recipient’s democracy status, recipient’s 
alliance status, regional dummies for 
Middle East, recipient’s income per capita, 
and the number of NGO operations in a 
recipient country. These variables 
represent the test for the three theories of 
US foreign aids.  
The recipient’s democracy status is 
measured based on its polity scores. This 
is unit level data (level-1) rather than 
cluster level data because the status of 
democracy of a country may change at a 
particular time within the time span of the 
study. The data used here is Polity IV 
(Marshall, Gurr and Jagger 2014) which 
scores a country’s level of democracy 
according to some indicators such as 
government composition, elections, 
political participation and so on. The score 
varies from -10 representing full 
authoritarianism to 10 representing full 
democracy. I generate dummy variable of 
country democracy status based on these 
scores. For countries whose polity scores 
are 6 or more (>= 6), I categorize them as 
stable democracy (coded 1) and other 
(non-democracies) coded 0. Based on 
interest-based theory, we should expect 
negative correlation between foreign aids 
and the democracy status of recipient 
country (non-democracies received more 
money). However, due to the possibility of 
endogeneity relation between democracy 
index and foreign aids (Knack 2004), I 
would lag a country’s democracy  status 
by one year. Thus, it should be clear that it 
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is democracy that affects the number of 
foreign aids disbursed rather than the other 
way round.  
Alliance status data comes from 
Correlates of War Project (COW) Formal 
Alliance data set. These data categorize 
alliance status into four groups: non-
alliance (coded 0), entente (coded 1), 
neutrality pact (coded 2), and defense pact 
(coded 3). Entente generally refers to 
informal alliance between the US and 
another country. This informal alliance 
generally comes in the form of mutual 
understanding on some international 
issues. But, there is no obligation of one 
country to do something to other country 
under certain situations. In Neutrality pact, 
countries are formally committed to doing 
nothing in case a member of the pact goes 
to war against another country (be it 
outsider or another member of the pact). 
The main purpose of this pact is to prevent 
a country (usually a powerful country) to 
help another country (usually a weaker 
country) in case there is a conflict or war 
with a member of the pact. Finally, 
defense pact refers to a formal 
commitment of members to help each 
other in case one of them is attacked by 
outsiders. NATO is an example of this 
kind of pact (Gibbler 2009). This variable 
is unit level because the status of alliance 
can change over time. Because I am 
interested in seeing the effect of being 
defense US ally only, I dummy-code the 
variable where member of defense ally = 
1, else = 0. As the interest-driven theory 
suggests, I expect a positive association 
between the variable of alliance and the 
amount of US foreign aids received by the 
country.  
The data on recipients’ income per 
capita were originally obtained from 
United Nations Development Program 
(UNDP). The original measure of the 
variable is US$. However, due to the 
skewed nature of the data, I use 
logarithmic transformation of the data.  
This variable captures humanitarian need 
of a country for foreign aids. Because 
poorer countries need more foreign aids, 
humanitarian-based theory predicts that the 
amount of US foreign aids will increase 
for the country with lower GDP per capita. 
Thus, we expect negative correlation 
between this variable (GDP per capita) and 
the amount of US foreign aids.  
The data on the number of NGO 
operations in a recipient country also come 
from Kim (2014). These data were 
collected from the National Center for 
Charitable Statistics (NCCS, 
http://nccs.urban.org/), which provides a 
comprehensive list of US-based NGOs 
registered to the Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS). There are 40 NGOs out of 114 big 
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NGOs included in the data set due to 
information availability. Kim (2014) coded 
the information about the field operations 
of NGOs provided by their web sites, 
annual reports and other piece of 
information. He then combined the 
numbers of field operations of all 40 
NGOs in a recipient country. As the 
domestic political theory suggests, the 
amount of US foreign aids to a country 
increases as the number of US-based NGO 
operations in the country increases. Thus, 
we expect positive association between the 
amount of US foreign aids and the number 
of US-based NGO operations in recipient 
country.  
The cluster level variable that 
becomes the main independent variable is 
Middle-East dummy. This variable 
captures the expectation of interest-driven 
theory that Middle-East countries are 
important for American strategic and 
economic interests. Because Middle-East 
countries are expected to receive more US 
foreign aids than non-Middle East 
countries, I expect a positive association 
between this variable and the amount of 
US foreign aids received by a country. 
To avoid spurious relations, I also 
include a standard control variable, that is 
the total population of the recipients. I also 
log-transform the data to avoid extreme 
variation and skewness. The inclusion of 
this variable captures the different impacts 
of aids to recipient countries. Countries 
with more population will need more aids 
than those with small populations. The 
data were collected by Kim (2014) from 
World Development Indicators provided 
by the World Bank. I expect positive 
association between this variable and the 
amount of foreign aids given by the US.  
Because the data are clustered, with 
year treated as level-1 and country as 
level-2, and I am also interested in 
measuring the impact of cluster level 
variable on the dependent variable, I use 
multilevel modeling technique. Multilevel 
modelling technique is an appropriate 
technique to analyze growth model 
(Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002). At level-1, 
the amount of US foreign aids received by 
a particular country is represented by 
country’s growth trajectory that depends 
on its own unique sets of parameters. 
These individual country growth 
parameters become the outcome variable 
at level-2 in which it depends on country-
level variable (region). The level-2 
equations create different growth curve for 
each country because the level-2 variable 
distinguishes country from each other. 
Because I am interested in changes 
(growth) in foreign aids received by a 
country since 1960, I center the intercept at 
1960. By centering intercept at this year, I 
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can see to what extent there have been 
changes in the US foreign aids received by 
countries since 1960. I also grand-mean 
center the variable of democracy and 
defense_ally because I want to measure the 
impact of being both democracy and non-
democracy and being member and non-
member of US defense alliance on the 
amount of US foreign aids they received. 
Finally, I also grand-mean center the 
variable of population and GDP per capita 
to enable common sensical interpretation 
of the results. Finally, to overcome the 
issues of non-normality of the residuals at 
both level-1 and level-2 and of 
heteroscedasticity of level-1 residuals, I 
use robust standar errors (clustered on 
countries). I specify level-1 model this 
way

:  
Yti = π0i + π1i∗(year-1960) + 
π2i*([year-1960]
2
) + π3i*(ally) + 
π4i*(dem) + π5i*(lngdp)                           
+ π6i*(ngo) +  π7i*(lnpop) + eti, 
.........................................................
......................(1) 
Where Yti is the (log) amount of 
US foreign aids received by a country i in 
a given t year. π0i is the intercept or the 
amount of US foreign aids received by 
countries. π1i is the annual foreign aids 
                                                          

 Due to space limitation, I just write the full model 
(column 5, table 2) without enumerating level-1 
predictors with no random effects. Bold italic 
variables indicate the grand-mean centering.  
slope or rate of change parameter. π2i is the 
slope for quadratic year variable to capture 
the possible acceleration or deceleration in 
the annual growth of US foreign aids. π3i – 
π7i are slopes or rate of change for all 
independent variables (main independent 
variables and a control variable). eti is the 
residual deviation of each time (year) from 
the estimated trajectory.  The level-2 
model consists of regional Middle East 
dummy which is the characteristics of 
countries: 
π0i =  β00 + β01*(mideast) + r0i 
.......................................................................................................
.........(2) 
π1i =  β10 + β11*(mideast) + r1i 
.....................................................................
...............(3) 
Where β00 is the average (log) 
amount of US foreign aids given to 
developing countries in 1960. β01 is the 
coefficient of the impact of being countries 
in the Middle-East on US foreign aids. β10 
is the average annual growth of US foreign 
aids and β11 is the coefficient capturing the 
effect of being countries in the Middle-
East on the annual growth rate of US 
foreign aids. 
Result and Analysis 
The analysis in table 1 shows 
several interesting patterns regarding US 
foreign aids to developing countries. First, 
there is a small instantaneous growth in the 
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Figure 2. U.S. Foreign Aids, 1960-2008
amount of foreign aids US gave to 
developing countries in 1960. As shown in 
the model 3 (basic model including year 
variable), the rate of growth of US foreign 
aids to developing countries is only 7.7 
percent annually. When we include non-
linear effect of time (year squared) to see 
whether there is acceleration or 
deceleration in the growth of the amount 
of US foreign aids given to developing 
countries (model 4-5), we find that the 
linear effect of time (year) changes 
direction. However, the non-linear effect 
of year shows positive significant sign 
indicating that there is acceleration in the 
declining amount of US foreign aids since 
1960. However, due to a lack of control 
variable, we may suspect these unstable 
parameter estimates.  
Second, as shown in Figure 1, there 
is significant variation in the amount of US 
foreign aids among countries and across 
years. The variance of the adjusted mean 
of the amount of US foreign aids (τ00) is 
positive significant in all models. This 
shows that the amount of US foreign aids 
varies significantly among countries in 
1960. Similarly, the growth rates of US 
foreign aids also varies greatly among 
them. When we allow time variable (year) 
to vary, we see that the variance of year is 
positive significant in all models 3-5.  
Third, there is negative covariance 
between the intercept and the time variable 
(year) in models 3-5. This indicates that 
countries receiving higher amount of US 
foreign aids in 1960 tend to have lower-
than-average growth in their annual receipt 
of US foreign aids. Figure 2 to some extent 
shows this trend. Countries with high 
amount of US foreign aids receipts in 1960 
tend to have flatter slope compared with 
those receiving lower amount of aids in 
1960. Countries with highest amount of 
US foreign aids in 1960 even have 
negative slope, thus indicating that they 
received lesser amount of US foreign aids 
over time.  
Finally, there is also negative 
significant covariance between year and 
year squared variables. This is displayed in 
model 5. In general, this shows that though 
there is overall growth in the amount of 
US foreign aids to developing countries 
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over the years, there is deceleration in the 
growth over time. Generally, around 55 
percent of the variation in the amount of 
US foreign aids to developing countries 
over the years can be accounted for by the 
linear and non-linear effects of year.  
Table 1 
Models of US Foreign Aids, 1960-2008: 
Basic Models 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 mod
el1 
mod
el2 
mod
el3 
mod
el4 
mod
el5 
year  0.07
71*
** 
0.07
71*
** 
-
0.04
52** 
-
0.04
49 
  (0.0
111
) 
(0.0
111
) 
(0.0
32) 
(0.0
318) 
year_sq    0.00
260*
** 
0.00
259*
** 
    (0.0
0066
) 
(0.0
0066
) 
_cons -
1.47
0**
* 
-
3.28
3**
* 
-
3.28
2**
* 
-
2.34
5*** 
-
2.34
6*** 
 (0.2
68) 
(0.3
98) 
(0.3
98) 
(0.4
04) 
(0.4
04) 
Var(co
ns) 
10.8
75*
** 
10.9
02*
** 
23.7
92*
** 
23.8
06**
* 
24.1
40**
* 
 (0.7
58) 
(0.7
57) 
(1.8
64) 
(1.8
64) 
(2.0
83) 
Var(res
iduals) 
12.5
56*
** 
11.3
90*
** 
7.83
6**
* 
7.62
8*** 
5.68
3*** 
 (0.7
23) 
(0.7
57) 
(0.4
82) 
(0.4
54) 
(0.3
48) 
Var(yea
r) 
  0.01
8**
* 
0.01
8*** 
0.14
6*** 
   (0.0
02) 
(0.0
02) 
(0.0
19) 
Cov(co   - - -
ns,year) 0.48
6**
* 
0.48
6*** 
0.99
3*** 
   (0.0
68) 
(0.0
68) 
(0.1
99) 
Var(yea
r_sq) 
    0.00
006 
*** 
     (0.0
00) 
Cov(co
ns,year
_sq) 
    0.01
17**
* 
     (0.0
04) 
Cov(ye
ar,year
_sq) 
    -
0.00
3*** 
     (0.0
004) 
LL -
202
62.8
04 
-
199
07.6
59 
-
187
84.5
11 
-
1868
8.69
5 
-
1784
9.86
9 
AIC 405
31.6
08 
398
23.3
18 
375
81.0
22 
3739
1.38
9 
3571
9.73
9 
BIC 
N 
405
31.6
08 
744
1 
398
23.3
18 
744
1 
375
81.0
22 
744
1 
3739
1.38
9 
7441 
3571
9.73
9 
7441 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p 
< 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
 
Table 2 displays the main results of 
this research. Models 1-3 exhibit direct test 
of the three theories on US foreign aids. 
Each model represents each theory being 
tested. Model 1 tests interest based theory. 
There are three variables of interest in this 
model: ally, democracy and mideast_year. 
Generally, the average mean of US foreign 
aids given to developing countries, 
controling for the proportion of US 
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defense allies and democracies in 1960 is 
US$ 132 thousands. The variable of ally 
captures the impact of being a US defense 
ally on the amount of US foreign received 
by the countries. As the theory predicts, 
there should be positive signficant 
relationship between being a US ally and 
the amount of aids received. A cursory 
look at the coefficient of ally indicates that 
there is no empirical support for theory. 
Though the coefficient is positive, thus 
indicating a larger amount of aids these 
countries might received compared to non-
US allies, the large p-value for the variable 
signifies that the coefficient might be due 
to random errors.  
The variable of democracy tests 
whether US tended to provide more money 
to promote democracies, thus giving more 
aids to non-democracies than to 
democracies. As the theory predicts, there 
is negative significant relationship between 
being a stable democratic country and the 
amount of US foreign aids received by the 
country. As the proportion of stable 
democracies increases one unit, the 
amount of US foreign aids given to 
developing countries decreases around 132 
percent. However, in the full model, the 
significance of the coefficient disappears 
indicating that the estimate is not stable. 
And because the full model is the best 
model (based on model fit criteria), we 
have some reservations about the empirical 
support for this hypothesis. 
The variable of mideast_year is the 
cross-level interaction between mideast 
and year variables. This term captures the 
strategic significance of countries in the 
Middle East as suggested by interest-based 
theory. The term measures if countries in 
the Middle East received more US foreign 
aids annually compared to countries 
outside of the Middle East. Contrary to the 
expectation of the theory, there is negative 
significant relationship between 
mideast_year and lnaids. Instead of 
receiving higher amount of annual aids 
from the US, the countries in the Middle 
East precisely received 18 percent less US 
aids annually compared with non Middle 
East countries.  
Table 2. 
Three Models of US Foreign Aids, 1960-
2008 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Intere
st 
Huma
n 
Dome
stic 
Politi
cs 
Full 
Mode
l 
year196
0 
-
0.058
1 
0.105
* 
-
0.036
3 
0.129
** 
 (0.032
2) 
(0.04
45) 
(0.03
18) 
(0.04
61) 
year_sq 0.002
99*** 
0.000
294 
0.001
28 
-
0.000
840 
 (0.000
680) 
(0.00
0799) 
(0.00
0694) 
(0.00
0811) 
ally 0.317   -
0.688 
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 (0.738
) 
  (0.79
3) 
democra
cy 
-
1.323
** 
  -
0.427 
 (0.411
) 
  (0.36
9) 
lnpop_
mean 
0.644
*** 
0.550
*** 
0.255
* 
0.029
0 
 (0.127
) 
(0.12
4) 
(0.12
8) 
(0.14
6) 
mideast 1.273   1.393 
 (1.122
) 
  (1.57
6) 
mideast
_year 
-
0.120
*** 
  -
0.065
5 
 (0.032
2) 
  (0.03
84) 
lngdp_
mean 
 -
0.790
*** 
 -
0.663
** 
  (0.21
5) 
 (0.20
9) 
ngo   0.532
*** 
0.501
*** 
   (0.08
78) 
(0.07
70) 
_cons -
2.023
*** 
-
4.074
*** 
-
2.506
*** 
-
4.831
*** 
 (0.392
) 
(0.65
9) 
(0.40
0) 
(0.77
9) 
var(year
) 
0.016
*** 
0.025
*** 
0.021
*** 
0.029
*** 
 (0.002
2) 
(0.00
45) 
(0.00
27) 
(0.00
52) 
var(cons
) 
17.71
3*** 
32.65
4*** 
22.20
6*** 
38.62
7*** 
 (1.887
) 
(6.05
1) 
(1.99
7) 
(6.54
70) 
cov(con
s_year) 
-
0.410
*** 
-
0.799
*** 
-
0.585
*** 
-
0.990
*** 
 (0.055
) 
(0.15
76) 
(0.06
76) 
(0.17
64) 
var(Resi
dual) 
7.692
*** 
7.676
*** 
7.587
*** 
7.475
*** 
 (0.463 (0.53 (0.43 (0.51
) 67) 69) 10) 
LL -
18207
.7 
-
14277
.5 
-
18160
.0 
-
14192
.2 
aic 36439
.3 
28572
.9 
36338
.1 
28412
.4 
bic 36522
.0 
28632
.7 
36400
.1 
28505
.4 
N 7254 5669 7254 5669 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
In model 2, I test humanitarian-
based theory. There is one key variable 
examined here, that is income per capita 
(ln(GDP)). The variable is centered to its 
mean to ease the interpretation in the level-
2 outcome. Humanitarian theory predicts 
that lower income countries are expected 
to receive more US foreign aids than 
middle or higher income countries. As the 
model 2 exhibits, the coefficient of income 
per capita is negative significant as 
expected by the theory. Controling for the 
population, each percent decrease in a 
recipient’s GDP per capita is predicted to 
increase the amount of US foreign aids 
given to the country around 0.8 percent. 
Thus, there is an empirical support for 
humanitarian-based theory of US foreign 
aids. 
Finally, model 3 tests domestic 
political theory of US foreign aids. As 
theory suggests, there should be positive 
significant relationship between the 
number of US-based NGO operations in a 
country and the amount of US foreign aids 
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received by the countries because more 
NGO operations increase the reputation 
and credibility of the NGOs as information 
provider and lobbyist, thus increases their 
influence on foreign aids policy. 
Consequently, we would expect that the 
amount of foreign aids disbursed to the 
countries in which the number of US-
based NGO operations is higher will be 
higher as well. As model 3 shows, there is 
empirical support again for this theory. 
There is positive significant correlation 
between the number of NGO operations in 
a country and the amount of US foreign 
aids received by the country. Controling 
for the number of population, each 
additional increase in the number of NGO 
operations in a recipient country is 
predicted to increase the amount of US 
foreign aids to the country around 53 
percent.  
In general, only humanitarian and 
domestic political theories of US foreign 
aids are supported. The parameter 
estimates are stable even when we 
combine the model as shown in full model 
of US foreign aids (column 4). The 
coefficients of ln(GDP) and NGOs in the 
full model are slightly lower than those in 
model 2 and 3. However, they generally 
point to the same thing, that is, US foreign 
aids to developing countries are shaped by 
humanitarian and domestic political factors 
rather than (security) interest. In this 
model, we can also see that the rate of 
annual growth in US foreign aids to 
developing countries is around 13 percent. 
Regarding the model fit, the full 
model is the best among all other models. 
The deviance statistics (-2LL) shows that 
the deviance of the full model is the lowest 
among those of other models. The AIC 
and BIC of the full model are also the 
lowest among all other models. This 
indicates generally that the full model is 
the closest to the ―true model‖ (Dziak et al 
2012). Because I use robust standard 
errors, the parameter estimates in all the 
models are robust to any negative 
consequences of non-normality and 
heteroskedasticity of residuals. Model 
checking analysis also shows that errors at 
both level-1 and level-2 are independent of 
the predictors.   
Conclusion 
 This paper starts from the question 
of what explains the variation in US 
foreign aids to developing countries over 
time. I test three models explaining US 
foreign aids policy to these developing 
countries. The first theory is so-called 
interest-based theory viewing US foreign 
aids as a function of national security 
interests defined more narrowly as having 
strategic benefits to the US. This theory 
predicts that the amount of US foreign aids 
  Page 207 
Prodi Ilmu Hubungan Internasional FISIP UPN‖Veteran‖ Jakarta 
 
MANDALA 
Jurnal Hubungan Internasional 
Vol.1No.2  
Juli-Desember 
2018 
to US allies, non-democracies or countries 
in the strategic region such as Middle East 
will be higher than non-allies, stable 
democracies or countries outside the 
strategic region. These predictions are not 
empirically supported. The second theory, 
the so-called humanitarian-based theory, 
sees that US foreign aids to a particular 
country is based on humanitarian 
considerations such as poverty or 
protracted human sufferings. This theory 
predicts that the amount of US foreign aids 
to poorer countries will be higher than the 
amount disbursed to less poor countries. 
The theory’s prediction is supported by the 
data. Finally, the last theory explaining US 
foreign aids is domestic political theory. 
This theory argues that the variation in US 
foreign aids to developing countries is 
affected by the actions of domestic 
political actors. Among domestic political 
actors interested in US foreign aids, NGOs 
is perhaps the most important ones. As an 
information provider as well as lobbyist, 
NGOs can influence the US government 
decision regarding the amount of aids. 
This theory predicts that the countries with 
more NGO’s projects or operations tend to 
receive more aids than countries with less 
NGO projects. The theory’s prediction is 
also supported by the fact. 
 However, the results of the analysis 
should be interpreted cautiously. There are 
two issues raised here. First, the data might 
be biased in favor of the two supported 
theories. In fact, the data of foreign aids 
here do not include development programs 
related to security support in developing 
countries such as funds for training armies, 
etc. OECD only collects aid data related to 
social, economic and political 
development, excluding military-related 
aids. Second, the indicator(s) representing 
key variables of each theory are chosen 
based on data availability. In fact, there are 
some other variables that might be more 
appropriate representation of the concept 
implied in each theory. For example, GDP 
per capita is not the only way to test 
humanitarian-based theory. While this 
variable might indicate the level of 
poverty, the variable of poverty index is a 
more relevant variable to be included in 
the model. In general, variables 
representing protracted human sufferings 
need to be created and these might be more 
appropriate variables to test. 
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Appendix 
Descriptive Statistics 
 mean sd min max 
lnaid -1.47 4.84 -6.9 9 
ally 0.19 0.39 0.0 1 
lngdp 6.72 1.37 3.6 11 
dem 0.47 0.50 0.0 1 
ngo 1.98 3.25 0.0 25 
mideast 0.13 0.34 0.0 1 
lnpop 15.04 2.06 9.4 21 
N 7595    
 
 
References 
Bryk, A. S., & Raudenbush, S. W. (2002). 
Hierarchical linear models: 
Application And Data Analysis 
Methods (2nd ed.). Sage Publications, 
Inc.: Thousand Oaks, CA. 
DeMars, Williams. (2005) NGOs and 
Transnational Networks: Wild Cards 
in World Politics. London: Pluto Press 
London. 
Dziak, John D., Donna L. Coffman, 
Stephanie. T. Lanza, Runze Li. 
(2012). Sensitivity and Specificity of 
Information Criteria. Technical Report 
Series #12-119. Pennsylvania: The 
Methodology Center and the College 
of Health and Human Development. 
Accessed on Oct 18, URL 
http://methodology.psu.edu/media/tec
hreports/12-119.pdf 
Easterly, William. (2003) Can Foreign Aid 
Buy Growth? The Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 17: 23–48. 
Feyzioglu, Tarhan, Vinaya Swaroop, and 
Min Zhu. (1998) A Panel Data  
Analysis of the Fungibility of Foreign 
Aid. The World Bank Economic 
Review 12: 29–58. 
Gibler, Douglas M. (2009). International 
military alliances, 1648-2008. CQ Press.   
Hook, Steven. (1995) National Interest 
and Foreign Aid. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. 
Jeremy M. Sharp. (2015). U.S. Foreign 
Aid to Israel. Congressional Report. 
Congressional Research Service. June 
10. Washington, DC. 
Jones, Toby Craig. (2012). America, Oil, 
and War in the Middle East. Journal 
of American History 99 (1): 208-218. 
Kim, Youngwan. (2014). How NGOs 
Influence U.S Foreign Aids 
Allocations. Foreign Policy Analysis, 
10(4), 1-20. 
Lai, Brian. (2003). Examining the Goals of 
US Foreign Assistance in the Post-
Cold War Period, 1991–96. Journal of 
Peace Research, 40(1), 103–128. 
Lancaster, Carol. (2006). Foreign Aid: 
Diplomacy, Development, Domestic 
Politics. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Lewis, David. (2007). Management of 
Non-Governmental Development 
Organizations, 2nd edition. London: 
Routledge. 
  Page 209 
Prodi Ilmu Hubungan Internasional FISIP UPN‖Veteran‖ Jakarta 
 
MANDALA 
Jurnal Hubungan Internasional 
Vol.1No.2  
Juli-Desember 
2018 
Marshall, Monty G., Ted Robert Gurr and 
Keith Jagger. (2014). Polity IV 
Project: Political Regime 
Characteristics and Transitions, 
1800-2013. Virginia: Center for 
Systematic Peace 
Mayer, W. and P. Raimondos-Møller. 
(1999). The politics of foreign aid. 
University of Cincinnati, Copenhagen 
Business School 
——— and ———, (2006). How do 
political changes influence US 
bilateral aid allocations? Evidence 
from panel data. Review of 
Development Economics 10, 210–223 
McCormick, James, and Neil Mitchell. 
(1988). Is US Aid Really Linked to 
Human Rights in Latin America? 
American Journal of Political Science, 
32(1), 231–239. 
McGillivray, Mark. (2003). Modeling Aid 
Allocation: Issues, Approaches, and 
Results. Journal of Economic 
Development 28: 171–188. 
McKinlay, Robert, and Richard Little. 
(1977). A Foreign Policy Model of US 
Bilateral Aid Allocation. World 
Politics, 30(1), 58–86. 
Meernik, James, Eric Krueger, and Steven 
Poe. (1998). Testing Models of US 
Foreign Policy: Foreign Aid During 
and after the Cold War. The Journal of 
Politics, 60(1), 63–85. 
Murshed, S. M., (2004). Strategic 
interaction and donor policy 
determination. International Review of 
Economics and Finance 13, 311–323. 
Palmer, Glenn, Scott Wohlander, and T. 
Clifton Morgan. (2002). Give or Take: 
Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy 
Substitutability. Journal of Peace 
Research 39: 5–26. 
Reimann, Kim (2006.) A View from the 
Top: International Politics, Norms and 
the Worldwide Growth of NGOs. 
International Studies Quarterly 50: 
45–68. 
Russett Bruce M. (1993). Grasping the 
Democratic Peace. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press 
Schraeder, Peter, Steven Hook, and Bruce 
Taylor. (1998). Clarifying the Foreign 
Aid Puzzle: A Comparison of 
American, Japanese, French, and 
Swedish Aid Flows. World Politics 
50:294– 
 
